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CURRENT LEGISLATION
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS AcT.-Hailed by the American
Federation of Labor as the "Magna Carta of Labor," derogated by
the employers as a pernicious instrument of oppression, and rele-
gated to the limbo of unconstitutionality by the Liberty League, the
National Labor Relations Act takes its place as a statute of pre-
dominant importance in the history of labor legislation. Its fate is
fraught with momentous consequences not only to employer and em-
ployee, but also to lawyer and layman, for unfavorable treatment of
the statute by the Supreme Court will lead to repercussions which
may find their way into our very Constitution. It is for these rea-
sons that this Act requires the careful consideration of every student
of current affairs.
Section 7(a) of the N. I. R. A.
With the advent of the New Deal came the promulgation of an
ostensibly new principle in industrial affairs-the industrial part-
nership between employer and employee.' Seeking, in the main, to
give industrial self-government the chance to assert itself, the
N. I. R. A. sought to safeguard the rights of employees to organize
and bargain collectively 2 through representations of their own choos-
ing. The statute imposed on employers the obligation to enter into
negotiations with the employees and attempt to consummate an
agreement. If the negotiative process failed because of a bona fide
difference, the statutory obligation was discharged. 3
Hailed by labor and by many commentators on the industrial
situation as the "Magna Carta" of the employee,4 Section 7(a)
turned out to be a parva carta which failed completely of its pur-
pose. The numerous vagaries-interference, restraint or coercion-
embodied in the legislation made for a proliferation of interpreta-
I TEAD AND METCALF, LABOR RELATIONS UNDER THE RECOVERY ACT (1933),
c. I.
2 N. I. R. A., Act of June 16, 1933, 48 STAT. 198, 15 U. S. C. A. § 707 (a).
'See KLEECK AND FLEDDERUS (Editors), ON EcozNllIC PLANNING (1935),
c. 8, Collective Bargaining (7A) and Trade Union Recognition Under the
National Recovery Administration, by Milion Handler, formerly General
Counsel of the National Labor Board. It should be noted that the term "collec-
tive bargaining" was not defined by Section 7 (a). However, the NLRB
defined it "as a means to an end, the end being the execution of a collective
agreement. Negotiations were to be entered into with that in view." In the
case of In re Houde Engineering Corp., 1 NLRB 35, Aug. 30, 1934, the
NLRB explained that the end of collectiw bargaining is the making of collec-
tive agreements.
'Note (1934) 8 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 5.
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tions, which in turn made for great uncertainty.5 Another severe
indictment against 7(a) was that under it, contrary to expectations,
the company unions virtually blossomed forth. 6  A third weakness
of 7(a) was the failure to invest the old NLRB with enforce-
ment powers.7 With the realization of these glaring defects came a
concerted attempt to remedy the "negotiative process" initiated by
the N. R. A.
The 'Wagner Labor Relations Act is unquestionably a logical
extension of the policy of 7(a) .8 Salvaging the best features of the
former statute and avoiding its vagaries, the new statute is both spe-
cific in its promulgations and potent in its method of attaining the
aims set forth.
National Labor Relations Act.
The National Labor Relations Act 9 is designed to diminish the
causes of labor disputes burdening or obstructing interstate and for-
eign commerce. Being, in the main, a clarification and amplifica-
tion of the generalities of Section 7(a), it guarantees to the em-
ployees the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor
organizations, and to bargain collectively.' 0
The most significant substantive provisions of the statute are
those concerned with the unfair labor practices of the employer.:"
The first unfair-labor-practice forbids the employer from interfering
with, restraining, or coercing employees in the exercise of their right
'See KLEECK AND FLEDDERUS, op. cit. supra note 3, at p. 157: "The chief
problem under 7 (a) has been the definition of the words interference,
restraint and coercion." The Brookings Institute has stated that "7 (a) of the
Recovery Act is uncertain in purpose, vague in its contents, and ambiguous
in language."
8 The report of the National Industrial Conference Board stated that the
number of members of company unions rose from 432,000 in 1932 to 1,164,000
in 1933, representing a gain of 169%. More than 61% of the company
unions were inaugurated after the passage of the Recovery Act.
' The old NLRB was not vested with enforcement powers. It referred
all recommendations to the National Recovery Administration. The latter fre-
quently overlooked 7 (a) in order to compromise with industry in the adoption
of the codes of fair competition. A further weakness was the fact that 7 (a)
was applicable only where there was a code, thereby putting recalcitrants in a
favorable position. Furthermore, the original Board had no power of subpoena
investigation except in connection with elections. Although it had power to
conduct elections, it had no power to compel compliance with its decisions.
CONG. REc., 74th Cong., 1st Sess., Vol. 79, No. 101, May 15, 1935, pp. 7849-
7850.
'Francis Biddle, Chairman of the old National Labor Relations Board,
stated that the "Labor Disputes Act was a logical extension of the policy of
Section 7 (a)." Hearings before Senate Committee on Education and Labor,
pt. 1, March 11, 1935, p. 76.
'49 STAT. 449, c. 372, approved July 5, 1935, 29 U. S. C. A. § 151 et seq.
1029 U. S. C. A. § 157.
"Id. § 158.
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to collective bargaining and similar concerted activities., 2  The sec-
ond unfair-labor-practice concerns the problem of the company union.
The employer is specifically forbidden "to dominate or interfere with
the formation or administration of any labor organization or con-
tribute financial or other support to it." 13 This provision aims to
propagate the principle of collective bargaining through representa-
tives of the employees' own choosing and to prevent the domination
and interference of the employer. The third unfair-labor-practice
deals with the problem of the closed shop. The employer is for-
bidden to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organiza-
tion by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or
any other term or condition of employment. 14 The closed shop
agreement is valid only when the employee's organization has been
free from company influences from its very inception. Further-
more, the validity of the agreement depends on the acquiescence of
the organization representing a majority of the employees. The fourth
unfair-labor-practice proviso makes it unlawful to discharge or dis-
criminate against an employee because he has filed charges or given
testimony under the Act.15 The fifth and last provision makes it
' Id. § 158, subd. 1. This language virtually follows verbatim the prin-
ciples embedded in the Railway Labor Act of 1926, § 2; Norris-LaGuardia Act,
§ 2; Bankruptcy Act of 1932, § 77 (p) and (q); National Industrial Recovery
Act, § 7 (a) ; the Act creating the office of the Federal Coordinator of Trans-
portation, § 7 (e). CONG. REc., 74th Cong., 1st Sess., Vol. 79, No. 101, May
15, 1935, p. 7851.
" Id. § 158, subd. 2. This section has its counterpart in the Railway Labor
Act Amendments of 1934, § 2; Bankruptcy Act Amendments of 1933-34;
Emergency Transportation Act, § 7 (e). A pertinent appraisal of company
unions and their derogatory influence on labor relations can be found in 1
NLRB 181 et seq. (1934). For a discussion of the defects of the company
union, see Hearings before Senate Committee on Education and Labor, March
18, 1935, pp. 164-65; also REPORT No. 573 OF THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON
EDUCATION AND LABOR, May 2, 1935, p. 19. The latter report states that
Section 7 (a) gave rise to 70% of the company unions. An impartial investi-
gation of the company union by the Twentieth Century Fund disclosed that, at
best, "it is not well suited to extend its cooperative activities beyond the bounds
of a single employer unit." This survey presents irrefragable evidence in
support of the fact that the company union is the mere creature of the employer
and is unsuited to deal with a problem of hours and wages, problems which are
national in scope. LABOR AND THE GOVERNMENT, TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND
(1935) 323-334.
2Id. §158, subd. 3. This provision reiterates and extends the principles
propounded in the Norris-LaGuardia Act which makes "yellow dog" contracts
unenforceable in the federal courts. This provision does not interfere with
the status quo of the debatable subject of the closed shop. It holds that nothing
shall preclude the consummation of closed shop agreements. There are two limi-
tations to the closed shop agreements. First, the agreement must be made with a
labor organization that represents the majority of employees in the appropriate
collective bargaining unit covered by such agreement. Second, the agreement
cannot be entered into with any organization defined as an unfair labor practice.
SENATE COMMITTEE ON EDUCATION AND LABOR, REP. No. 573, May 2, 1935,
p. 11.
"Id. § 158, subd. 4. This is similar to Executive Order 6711 of May 15,
1934, forbidding an employer operating under a Code to dismiss an employee
for complaining or furnishing evidence with regard to a violation of the Code.
[ VOL. 10
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illegal to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his
employees.16
For the purpose of facilitating the procedure of collective bar-
gaining, the Act advocates the prirciple of majority rule. Only those
representatives selected by a majority of the employees shall be the
exclusive representatives of all the employees in the unit for the
purpose of collective bargaining. 17
Provision is made for the creation of a National Labor Rela-
tions Board, composed of three members, who shall be appointed
by the President with the consent of the Senate.' 8 The function of
this Board is quasi-judicial in nature. It is charged with the in-
vestigation and determination of charges of unfair-labor-practices and
questions of representation for the purpose of collective bargaining. 9
The law stipulates a procedure designed to prevent employers from
being deprived of their rights. Each employer is entitled to three
open hearings-a local one, an appeal to the National Labor Rela-
tions Board, and a final appeal to the Circuit Court of Appeals be-
fore the cease and desist order against unfair-labor-practices can be
granted.20 To prevent the continuance of unfair-labor-practices the
Board is empowered to issue cease and desist orders requiring em-
"Id. § 158, subd. 5. This provision stipulates correlative rights and duties
as to employers and employees. Erch is under a duty to enter into bona fide
negotiations and to exert every reasonable effort to reach an agreement. There
is no compulsion whatever to enter into a compact which is deemed unsatisfac-
tory to any party. CONG. REc., supra note 12, at 7852.
' Id. § 159. The principle of majority rule is based on solid precedent. It
was applied during the World War in the National War Labor Board of 1918
and has been consistently applied in the Railway Labor Board created by the
Transportation Act of 1920. The 1934 Amendment to the Railway Labor Act
provided for it. Although not specifically provided in Public Resolution No.
44, it was unquestionably contemplated therein. CONG. REc., supra note 12,
at 7852-3. With regard to the matter of election of representatives for the
purpose of bargaining, § 159 (d) attempts to rectify the undue delay under
Public Resolution No. 44. The efficacy of this resolution was greatly impaired
by the provision for court review of elections prior to the holding of the
election. Subdivision (d) specifies that there shall be no right to court review
anterior to the holding of an election. Senator Wagner, Hearings before Senate
Committee on Education and Labor, March 11, 1935, pp. 49-50. For a discus-
sion and explanation of the doctrine of collective bargaining as a means to an
end, see Matter of Houde Engineering Corp., 1 NLRB 35, Aug. 30, 1934;
HOUSE COMMITTEE ON LABOR, REP. No. 1147, June 10, 1935, pp. 19-22.
" Id. § 153. Under the N. R. A. the first national agency to handle labor
disputes was the National Labor Board, created Aug. 5, 1930. By Executive
Order 6763 of June 29, 1934, under authority of the Joint Congressional Reso-
lution of June 19, 1934 (73d Cong., Pub. Res. No. 44, H. J. Res. 375) the
President established the NLRB. Powerless to enforce its own decisions, its
findings and orders were nothing more than recommendations. NLRB, Release,
Feb. 13, 1935, p. 7. Section 153 stipulates the creation of a new board which
replaces the old NLRB.
1 Id. §§ 160-61.
fId. § 160 (b), (c), and (d). See World-Telegram, Dec. 23, 1935,
16:1 (ed.).
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ployers to refrain from such unfair labor practices 21 and to peti-
tion any circuit court of appeals for the enforcement of such orders
by appropriate temporary relief or restraining order.
22
Constitutionality.
Lacking the omniscience of the Liberty League,23 we, in dis-
cussing the constitutionality of this new legislation, are compelled to
resort to that laconism of dubiety--if. If the Supreme Court should
resort to a reiteration of those ancient and familiar principles pro-
pounded in Adair v. United States,2 4 Coppage v. Kansas,25 Lochner
v. New York.26 and Adkins v. Children's Hospital of District of
Columbia2 7 then the Act is doomed. The very mention of the words
boycott, 28 picketing,29 and "yellow-dog" contracts, 30 call to mind a
'Id. § 166 (c). See HousE COMMITTEE ON LABOR, REP. No. 1147, June
10, 1935, pp. 5-7. The Board is also empowered to take such affirmative action
as will effectuate the policies of the Act-reinstatement of employees with or
without pay.
21d. § 160 (e). The form and nature of the Board's orders will be subject
to court review along with the other determinations and actions of the Board.
The findings of the Board as to facts, if supported by evidence, shall be
conclusive.
' National Lawyers Committee of the American Liberty League, Report
on the Constitutionality of the National Labor Relations Act (Sept. 5, 1935).
-'208 U. S. 161, 28 Sup. Ct. 227 (1908).
'236 U. S. 1, 35 Sup. Ct. 240 (1915).
198 U. S. 45, 25 Sup. Ct. 539 (1905).
=261 U. S. 525, 43 Sup. Ct. 394 (1923).
'The Supreme Court has frequently condemned the boycott as an unlawful
weapon. See Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U. S. 274, 28 Sup. Ct. 301 (1908), the
Danbury Hatters' case; Gompers v. Bucks Stove and Range Co., 221 U. S. 418,
31 Sup. Ct. 492 (1911). In the latter case an injunction was issued against the
boycott of the products of the Bucks Stove and Range Co. by the American
Federation of Labor and its affiliated unions. See also LAIDLER, BOYCOTTS AND
THE LABOR STRUGGLE (1913) 174-77.
' In the American Steel Foundries Co. v. Tri-City Central Trades'
Council, 257 U. S. 184, 42 Sup. Ct. 72 (1921), the Court held all picketing to
be unlawful and, at the same time, stated that the legality of this method of
persuasion depended on the facts and circumstances of each case. In this case
the union was permitted to place a picket at each factory entrance. In the
same year the case of Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U. S. 312, 42 Sup. Ct. 124 (1921)
decided that mass picketing is violative of the constitutional guarantees of
liberty and property, and that no state can legalize such conduct. COMMONS
AND ANDREWS, PRINCIPLES OF LABOR LEGISLATION (revised ed. 1927) 119-22.
'In Adair v. United States, 208 U. S. 161, 28 Sup. Ct. 227 (1908), the
Court declared Section 10 of the Erdman Act unconstitutional. The Act made
it a misdemeanor for interstate carriers or their agents to discharge or dis-
criminate against employees because of membership in a trade union. The
Court regarded this as a denial of due process under the Fifth Amendment.
In Coppage v. Kansas. 236 U. S. 1, 35 Sun. Ct. 240 (1915), the Court declared
unconstitutional a Kansas statute which mad-e it a misdemeanor for an employer
to require an employee not to become or remain a member of a labor organiza-
tion during the time of his employment as an unreasonable restriction upon the
liberty of contract. Chief Justice Hughes, then an associate justice, dissented
[ VOL. 10
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host of decisions wherein the interests of labor were treated sum-
marily. These decisions, exemplary of the philosophy of a by-gone
era, attempt to perpetuate that shibboleth of our pioneering days-
freedom of contract between employer and employee. One cannot help
but comment on the irony of this tender solicitude for the right of the
employee to contract with the employer in a free and open market
-a solicitude which saves for him the right to contract for long
hours and low wages.31 The attempt of the court to deal with this
new legislation on the basis of this out-moded theory would be to
overlook facts familiar to and appreciated by high school students.
If, however, the court pursues the liberality of interpretation dis-
played in Holden v. Hardy,32 Bunting v. Oregon,33 and in Texas &
New Orleans R. R. v. Brotherhood of Railroad Clerks,34 then there
is a decided probability that the court will take cognizance of the find-
ings of Congress and its declaration of policy in the Act-a recog-
nition which would bode well for its validity.
most vigorously. In Hitchman Coal and Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U. S.
229, 38 Sup. Ct. 65 (1917), the Court sustained an injunction enjoining the
United Mine Workers' Union from trying to bring into its organization
employees of the Hitchman Co. who had signed a contract not to join the
union while in the employ of the company. In the Red Jacket case (United
Mine Workers of American v. Red Jacket Consolidated Coal and Coke Co.,
18 F. [2d] 839 [1927]), the Court granted an injunction enjoining a labor
organization from advising or persuading employees to break their contract of
employment. See Note (1935) 9 ST. JOHN'S L. R~v. 462.
' With reference to the Adair case, Dean Roscoe Pound of Harvard said:
"To every one acquainted at first hand with actual industrial conditions, the
latter statement (statement made by Ward in his Applied Sociology that 'much
of the discussion about equal rights' is utterly hollow. All the ado made over
the system of contract is surcharged with fallacy') goes without saying. Why,
then, do courts persist in the fallacy? Why do so many of them force upon
legislation an academic theory of equality in the face of practical conditions
of inequality? Why do we find a great and learned Court in 1908 taking the
long step in the past of dealing with the relations between employer and
employee in railway transportation as if the parties were individuals-as if they
were farmers haggling over the sale of a horse? Why is the legal conception
of the relation of employer and employee so at variance with the common
knowledge of mankind." Quoted in CoMMONS, TRADE UNIONISM AND LABOR
PROBLEMS (2d Series) 579. See also CuMMINS, THE LABOR PROBLEM IN THE
UNITED STATES (1932) 619-22; Pound, Liberty of Contract (1909) 18 YALE
L. J. 454.
' 169 U. S. 366, 18 Sup. Ct. 383 (1898). This case affirmed the constitu-
tionality of legislation reducing the hours of labor of men who worked in
smelters and underground. In this decision "the Court recognized what had
been dimly seen or implied from the beginning of labor legislation, that
inequality of bargaining power is a justification under which the state may
come to the protection of the weaker party to the bargain." COMMONS A%-D
ANDREWS, PRINCIPLES OF LABOR LEGISLATION (1916 ed.) 27.
'243 U. S. 241, 37 Sup. Ct. 435 (1917). In this case the Supreme Court
upheld an Oregon statute limiting the hours of labor of any person in industries
not peculiarly unhealthful or dangerous. This decision, in effect, set aside the
Lochner case. Only four of the justices who decided the Lochner case sat in
the Bunting case and three of these had been dissenters.
' 281 U. S. 548, 50 Sup. Ct. 427 (1930).
1936 ]
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Let us now turn to a consideration of the technical questions
confronting the court:
I. Does the Act violate the due process clause 35 of the United
States Constitution? The proponents of the legislation place all
their faith in the Clerks case.36 They contend that a perusal of the
case discloses judicial recognition of the authority of Congress to
guarantee freedom of organization, to prohibit the company-
dominated union, and to prevent employers from requiring member-
ship or non-membership in any union. They further see in that
decision not only a reversal of the Adair and Coppage 37 cases but a
presage of a new tolerant attitude of the court towards organized
labor and labor legislation.38 The opponents of the Act base their
U. S. CoNsT. Amendt. V.
Texas & New Orleans R. R. v. Brotherhood of Railroad Clerks, 281
U. S. 548, 50 Sup. Ct. 427 (1930). This action was commenced by a labor
union to enjoin the railroad from interfering, in violation of the Railway Act
of 1926, with the right of its employees to self-organization and the designation
of representatives. A perusal of the case discloses that the Court took a
position in essential contradiction to that taken in the Adair case. The Court
considered t&.e taking away of railway passes from the union leaders, the
discharge of union leaders, and the paying of the expenses of recruiting mem-
bers of the company union as being unlawful coercion on the part of the
railroad. Although the anti-union contract was not involved, Senator Wagner
thinks it riasonable to infer that, since the aforementioned acts were unlawful
coercion, it would also have regarded the anti-union contract in the same light.
CONG. REc., mtpra note 12, at 7853.
The Railway Clerks case held that the discharge of union leaders by the
railroad is an act that constitutes the use of coercion to prevent employees
from exercising their right of self-organization and designation of representa-
tives granted them under the Railway Labor Act. The Adair case held invalid
a provision forbidding the railroads to discharge union men because of their
membership. The only difference between the two cases is that in the former,
union leaders were involved, and in the latter union members. This is undeniably
a difference without a distinction. For a study of the effect of the Clerks case
on the Adair and Coppage cases, see Berman, The Supreme Court Interprets
the Railway Labor Act (1930) 20 Am. EcoN. Rlv. 619, at 628 et seq.; Cum-
MINs, THE LABOR PROBLEM IN THE U. S. (1932) 630, 631; Note (1935) 2
GEo. WASH. L. REv. 230.
It is of interest to observe that the opinion in the Clerks case was rendered
by Chief Justice Hughes, an opinion which is similar in reasoning to his dissent
in the Coppage case, and that the two cases are really identical in principle.
I Chief Justice Hughes, writing for a unanimous Court in the Texas &
New Orleans R. R. v. Brotherhood of Railroad Clerks, supra note 36, at 570,
stated: "The power to regulate commerce is the power to enact 'all appropriate
legislation' for its 'protection and advancement; to adopt measures to promote
its growth and insure its safety; to foster, protect, control and restrain.'
Exercising this authority, Congress may facilitate the amicable settlement of
disputes which threaten the service of the necessary agencies of interstate
transportation. In shaping its legislation to this end, Congress was entitled
to take cognizance of actual conditions and to address itself to practical
measures. The legality of collective action on the part of employees in order
to safeguard their proper interests is not to be disputed. It has long been
recognized that employees are entitled to organize for the purpose of securing
the redress of grievances and to promote agreements with employers relating
to rates of pay and conditions of work. American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City
[ VOL. 10
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attack on the principles enunciated in the Adair and Coppage cases.30
In this issue of theory versus reality, there is every reason to believe
that the court will face the facts. It is of interest to note that Judge
Otis, in holding the statute unconstitutional, 40 based his decision on
the commerce clause and did not consider the due process argument.
II. Can federal jurisdiction over this relationship be sustained
under the commerce clause? 41 In view of the limited interpretation
placed on the commerce clause by the Schechter case,42 this issue
furnishes the acid test.43 The fact that strikes burden commerce has
been constantly reiterated by the Supreme Court.44 Since Congress
is authorized to prevent any burden whatsoever upon interstate com-
merce, Congress can enjoin unfair practices which tend to disrupt
commerce. Since strikes burden interstate commerce, the proponents
reason that -Congress has the power to enjoin unfair labor practices
even before strikes occur.45  By invalidating these unfair-labor-
practices, Congress aims to eliminate those practices which destroy
Central Trade Council, 257 U. S. 184, 209. Congress was not required to ignore
this right of the employees but could safeguard it and seek to make their
appropriate collective action an instrument of peace rather than of strife. Such
collective action would be a mockery if representation were made futile by
interferences with freedom of choice. Thus the prohibition by Congress of
interference with the selection of representatives for the purpose of negotiation
and conference between employers and employees, instead of being an invasion
of the constitutional right of either, was based on the recognition of the rights
of both."
*'National Lawyers Committee of the American Liberty League, Report
on the Constitutionality of the National Labor Relations Act (Sept. 5, 1935)
32-36.
"0 12 F. Supp. 864, Dec. 21, 1935. In the recent decision banded down by
Judge J. P. Barnes declaring the Wagner Act unconstitutional, much emphasis
was placed on the due process argument. The judge found the stipulation in
the Act requiring the employer to bargain with the majority unit of his em-
ployees as representative of all his employees a flagrant deprivation of the
property rights guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment-the right of an employer
to deal freely with each and all of his employees. N. Y. Times, March 25,
1936, 1:5. See infra note 49.
. U. S. CoNsT. Art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
'A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corp. et al. v. United States, 295 U. S. 459,
55 Sup. Ct. 837 (1935).
For a careful analysis of the constitutionality of the statute under the
commerce clause, see Note (1935) 35 COL. L. REv. 1098 at 1114 et seq.
" In re Debs, 158 U. S. 564, 15 Sup. Ct. 900 (1895) ; Duplex Printing Co.
v. Deering, 254 U. S. 443, 41 Sup. Ct. 172 (1921) ; American Steel Foundries
v. Tri-City Central Trades Council, 257 U. S. 184, 42 Sup. Ct. 72 (1921);
Coronado Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 268 U. S. 295, 45 Sup. Ct. 551(1925) ; Bedford Cut Stone Co. v. Stone Cutters' Ass'n, 274 U. S. 37, 47 Sup.
Ct. 522 (1926).
"United Mine Workers v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U. S. 344, 42 Sup. Ct.
570 (1922). In this case Chief Justice Taft stated: "If Congress deems certain
recurring practices, although not really part of interstate commerce, likely to
obstruct, refrain, or burden it, it has the power to subject them to national
supervision or restraint."
19361
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equality of bargaining power and cause strikes, thereby removing
obstructions to interstate commerce.
A further argument is based on the complicated nature of our
economic structure, a structure wherein prices and wages and in-
terstate commerce are so inextricably interwoven into one fabric that
any maldistribution of buying power immediately affects the standard
of living, which, in turn, unbalances the structure and exercises a
devastating effect on commerce.46  Since the statute aims to maintain
and advance wage rates, it aims to mitigate obstructions to commerce
and therefore, it is reasoned, the Act is valid.
Two actions testing the validity of the statute have been tried
in the federal courts, and the two divergent opinions furnish an
index to the constitutional issue. In the case of Stout et al. v. Pratt
et at., District Judge Otis declared the Act unconstitutional. 47  Com-
plainants owned a small mill in Aurora, Missouri. They purchased
most of their wheat in Missouri, and some of it in Kansas. Some
of the flour manufactured was sold in Aurora and elsewhere in
Missouri, and some was shipped and sold in other states. Com-
plainants refused to bargain collectively with their employees. Judge
Otis declared the Act inapplicable to this "intrastate" mill because
the refusal of the owners to bargain collectively did not directly af-
fect commerce among the states. 48  Basing his decision on the premise
that manufacturing is not commerce, the judge decided that Congress
41 In Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U. S. 344 at 372, 53
Sup. Ct. 471 (1933), Chief Justice Hughes said: "The interests of producers
and consumers are interlinked. When industry is grievously hurt, when pro-
ducing concerns fail, where unemployment mounts, and communities dependent
upon profitable production are prostrated, the wells of commerce go dry."
This argument is, in part, based on the case of Chicago Board of Trade v.
Olsen, 262 U. S. 1 at 40, 43 Sup. Ct. 470 (1922), wherein the Court said: "The
question of price dominates trade between the States. Sales of an article
which affect the country-wide price of the article directly affect the country-
wide commerce in it. For this reason Congress has the power to provide the
appropriate means adopted in this act by which this abuse may be restrained
and avoided." The proponents claim that wages are indistinguishable from
prices in their effect on commerce. CONG. REc., supra note 12, at 7853.
" 12 F. Supp. 864, Dec. 21, 1935, W. D. Missouri. See N. Y. Times, Dec.
22, 135, 1:1. This was an action by complainants for a temporary injunction
]gainst Pratt, Regional Director of the National Labor Relations Board. Com-
plainants prayed for injunctive relief against the prosecution of the Board's
complaint that complainants refused to bargain collectively in respect to rates
of pay, wages, hours of employment and other conditions of employment with
Federal Union No. 20,028 as the exclusive representative of all the employees
in said unit.
s Judge Otis buttresses his position with dicta from A. L. A. Schechter
Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U. S. 459, 496, 55 Sup. Ct. 837, 850
(1935): "If the commerce clause were construed to reach all enterprises and
transactions which could be said to have an indirect effect upon interstate
commerce, the federal authority would embrace practically all the activities of
the people, and the authority of the state over its domestic concerns would
exist only by sufferance of the federal government. Indeed, on such a theory,
even the development of the state's commercial facilities would be subject to
federal control."
[ VOL. 10
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cannot regulate under the commerce clause the relations between em-
ployers and employees in manufacturing.49 The findings and the
statement of policy contained in the statute50 Judge Otis labeled as
" "Manufacturing is not commerce, nor any part of commerce. Nothing is
more firmly established in constitutional law than that. Congress, therefore,
under the commerce power cannot regulate manufacturing. Hence it cannot
regulate the relations between employers and employees in manufacturing, as
commerce. Never can these relations be any part of commerce." Stout et a!.
v. Pratt et al., 12 Supp. 864 (Dec. 21, 1935) at 867. See supra- note 44 for
cases reiterating the fact that strikes do burden and obstruct commerce between
the states.
As this note was going to press, Federal Judge John P. Barnes of Chicago
handed down a decision wherein he declared the Wagner Act unconstitutional
in its entirety. The trend of his argument is very similar to that of Judge Otis.
In this case the Bendix Products Corporation sought an injunction to restrain
the National Labor Relations Board from interfering with its business, that is,
to enjoin the Board from ordering the petitioner to bargain with the unit
selected by the majority of its employees. Judge Barnes found the Act viola-
tive of the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment and the commerce clause.
The tenor of the judge's economic philosophy and his constitutional views can
be readily inferred from his answer to the defendant's contention that the
economic e~istence of business is completely'tied up with the constant flow of
materials and products from and into the channels of interstate commerce.
Says Judge Barnes: "This is the familiar but fallacious argument which would,
by judicial interpretation and construction, amend the commerce clause of the
Constitution by striking therefrom the words 'with foreign nations and among
the several states, and with the Indian tribes,' so that it shall read, simply,
'Congress shall have the power to regulate commerce,' and which would broaden
the definition of 'commerce' to include manufacturing, mining, agriculture and,
in fact, most of the activities of modern life. The relationship with which the
defendants propose to deal is a relationship between the plaintiff and its
production employees, who are engaged in making for plaintiff, in its plant in
Indiana, finished automobile and airplane parts and accessories from raw
materials, that is, manufacturing. Manufacturing is not commerce, nor does
the fact that the things manufactured are afterward to be shipped or used in
interstate commerce make their production a part thereof." N. Y. Times,
March 25, 1936, 1:5, 5.3, 4, 5, 6; N. Y. Times, March 26, 1936, 22:2 (editorial).
29 U. S. C. A. § 151. "Findings and Policy. The denial by employers
of the right of employees to organize and the refusal by employers to accept
the procedure of collective bargaining lead to strikes and other forms of
industrial strife or unrest, which have the intent or the necessary effect of
burdening or obstructing commerce by (a) impairing the efficiency, safety, or
operation of the instrumentalities of commerce; (b) occurring in the current
of commerce; (c) materially affecting, restraining, or controlling the flow of
raw materials or manufactured or processed goods from or into the channels
of commerce, or the prices of such materials or goods in commerce; or (d)
causing diminution of employment and wages in such volume as substantially
to impair or disrupt the market for goods flowing from or into the channels
of commerce.
"The inequality of bargaining power between employees who do not possess
full freedom of association or actual liberty of contract, and employers who are
organized in the corporate or other forms of ownership association substantially
burdens and affects the flow of commerce, and tends to aggravate recurrent
business depressions, by depressing wage rates and the purchasing power of
wage earners in industry and by preventing the stabilization of competitive
wage rates and working conditions within and between industries. * * *
"It is hereby declared to be the policy of the United States to eliminate
the causes of certain substantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce and
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syllogistic reasoning and not worthy of very much consideration.
The defendants, invoking the term "affecting commerce" as used in
the Act,51 maintained that Congress could regulate that which, not
itself a part of commerce among the states, directly affected com-
merce. The defendant's reference to the "stream of commerce"
cases 52 was deemed untenable on the ground that the applicability
of the phrase has been limited to situations wherein the thing moving
in commerce (cattle or grain) has been the same at the beginning
and at the end of the journey. Not content with the issuance of an
injunction against the National Labor Relations Board, Judge Otis
felt it incumbent on him to comment on the pending Congressional
resolution 53 to amend the Constitution-dicta on which one can
to mitigate and eliminate these obstructions when they have occurred by
encouraging the practice and procedure of collective bargaining and by protect-
ing the exercise by workers of full freedom of association, self-organization,
and designation of representatives of their own choosing, for the purpose of
negotiating the terms and conditions of their employment or other mutual aid
or protection."
29 U. S. C. A. §2 (7). "The term 'affecting commerce' means in
commerceL or burdening or obstructing commerce or the free flow of commerce,
or having led or tending to lead to a labor dispute burdening or obstructing
commerce or the free flow of commerce." Obviously, the purpose of this section
is to give the Act as extensive an application as possible.
' The defense placed great reliance on the "stream of commerce" cases.
In a number of cases the Supreme Court decided that Congress could regulate
that which is in a "stream of commerce", "current of commerce" or "flow of
commerce" among the states, even though the thing so regulated is an intrastate
transaction. In Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U. S. 375, 25 Sup. Ct. 276
(1905), the United States succeeded, pursuant to the ,Sherman Act, in restrain-
ing a conspiracy in restraint of trade. The Court concluded that a combination
of six large meat-packing houses, dealers, and commission men to refrain from
bidding against each other was a conspiracy aimed to impede the movement of
interstate commerce. The case of Stafford v. Wallace, 258 U. S. 495, 42 Sup.
Ct. 397 (1922) involved the Stockyards and Packers Act, an Act literally
regulating the local activities of the Chicago stockyards, the fees and activities
of commission men and dealers and related activities. The Court sustained the
Act on the "stream of commerce" theory. The case of Chicago Board of Trade
v. Olsen, 262 U. S. 1, 43 Sup. Ct. 470 (1923) sustained the Grain Futures Act,
although it regulated activities of a purely local character (practices of grain
exchanges and their members) on the ground that failure to control would have
a most deprecatory effect on the flow of interstate commerce. It is of interest
to observe that in the case of Hill v. Wallace, 259 U. S. 44, 42 Sup. Ct. 453
(1922), the Court invalidated the Future Trade Act, legislation similar to the
Grain Futures Act. Judicial recognition of Congressional investigations led the
Court to change its position. On the basis of these decisions the defendants
contended that "if wheat is exported from Kansas to a Missouri mill and flour
is exported from the Missouri mill to Iowa, that is a stream of commerce,
and, therefore, that the business of the mill, including the relations of employers
and employees therein, may be regulated by Congress."
The pending Congressional resolution, H. J. Res. 323, introduced June
12, 1935, and referred to the Committee on the Judiciary, reads: "The Congress
shall have power by laws uniform in their geographical operation to regulate
commerce, business, industry, finance, banking, insurance, manufactures, trans-
portation, agriculture, and the production of natural resources." Judge Otis
finds that under such an amendment the statute would be constitutional but
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predicate the jurist's attitude toward the labor problem.
About one month after this decision Judge J. D. Martin of the
Federal District Court of Memphis, Tenn., denied the application
of the Bemis Brothers Bag Company of Bemis, Tenn., for a stay
order to prevent a scheduled National Labor Relations Board inquiry
at Jackson, Tenn. 54 Finding the Act clearly consistent with Con-
gress's declared policy, Judge Martin stated that the courts should
not interfere except where a law is clearly unconstitutional- 5 In
deprecating the extreme use of the equity powers by lower federal
that the citizen will have become a subject. The irrelevancy of this statement
is too obvious for further comment.
" The report of this case has not as yet been published, and therefore our
information is based wholly on the account of the case as reported in the
N. Y. Times, Jan. 24, 1936, 4:6. It appears that the Labor Board hearing was
scheduled on the complaint of the Bemis local of the United Textile Workers
of America that the company sought to interfere with the rights of its employees
to bargain collectively under the Act.
This decision has since been published as Bemis Bro. Bag Co. v. Feidelson,
13 F. Supp. 153, Jan. 23, 1936, W. D. Tennessee. Judge Martin places great
emphasis on Marshall's famous interpretation of the elastic clause (U. S. CoNsT.
Art, I, § 8, cl. 18) in the case of McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316 at
415, 4 L. ed. 579 at 603, an interpretation which bears repetition.
"The subject is the execution of those great powers on which the welfare
of a nation essentially depends. It must have been the intention of those who
gave these powers to insure, as far as human prudence could insure, their
beneficial execution. This could not be done by confining the choice of means
to such narrow limits as not to leave it in the power of Congress to adopt any
which might be appropriate and which were conducive to the end. This provi-
sion is made in a Constitution intended to endure for ages to come, and,
consequently, to be adapted to the various crises of human affairs. To have
prescribed the means by which government should, in all future time, execute its
powers, would have been to change entirely the character of the instrument and
give it the properties of a legal code. It would have been an unwise attempt
to provide, by immutable rules, for exigencies which, if foreseen at all, must
have been seen dimly, and which can be best provided for as they occur. To
have declared that the best means shall not be used, but those alone without
which the power given would be nugatory, would have been to deprive the
legislature of the qapacity to avail itself of experience, to exercise its reason,
and to accommodate its legislation to circumstances."
I "It would be utterly inconsistent with the firm principle held by this
court to invade the powers of the legislative and executive departments of the
national government, by staying the proceedings of an important executive
board established by act of Congress, except upon a conclusion reached by the
court that such act is unconstitutional beyond the shadow of a doubt." N. Y.
Times, Jan. 24, 1936, 4:6. In line with this reasoning is the decision of
Federal Judge Rippey sustaining the validity of the Wagner Act. This decision
is summarized in the N. Y. Times, March 8, 1936, 15:1, 2, 3. Actions were
begun by the Precision Castings Company of Fayetteville, E. I. duPont de
Nemours & Co., and duPont Rayon Co. of Tonawanda, seeking temporary
injunctions restraining the Labor Relations Board from proceeding with
hearings on complaints by the Iron Molders' Union in the Precision case and
the United Textile Workers in the other cases. Both unions alleged violations
of Section 7 of the statute. Although the constitutionality of the Act was not
passed upon directly, judge Rippey held that a presumption of constitutionality
obtained in the absence of a showing by the complainants beyond all reasonable
doubt that the Act was as a whole unconstitutional.
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courts to enjoin the government from carrying out the express will
of Congress, the judge took his stand with all those opposed to
"judicial legicide." '6
These two opinions furnish an index to the constitutional issue.
Which position the Justices of the Supreme Court will take will de-
pend on their economic views. A reiteration of "familiar principles,"
such as formed the basis of the Schechter case, will be fatal. How-
ever, a recognition of the economic exigencies engendered by the
frequent clashes between employer and employee 57 may be the de-
cisive factor in the validation of the Act.
It is of interest to. observe that this legislation is considered so
salutary and desirable in its implications that Mayor LaGuardia in-
tends to offer it as a city labor law, if the United States Act is de-
clared unconstitutional, 58 and a state labor bill embodying the prin-
ciples of the Wagner Statute has already been introduced into the
New York State Assembly.59
Conclusion.
In its attempt to ameliorate industrial strife, the government must
seek a nodus operandi, a procedure which lies somewhere between
laissez faire and compulsory arbitration. Mediation or conciliation
is unquestionably unsuited to the settlement of important disputes. 60
The other extreme, compulsory arbitration,6 ' has been used most
extensively in Australia and New Zealand. 62  The only experiment
in compulsory arbitration in the United States was instituted in
Kansas, 63 an experiment which not only proved unsatisfactory but
'World-Telegram, Dec. 23, 1935, 16:1 (editorial).
"Between 1915 and 1931 there were 4,856 strikes, involving the surrender
of 2,795,000 jobs and the loss of 72,957,000 working days. At least $1,000,000,000
per year have been wasted because of these controversies." CONG. REc., supra
note 12, at 7853.
N. Y. Times, Jan. 8, 1936, 1:5.
N. Y. Times, Jan. 30, 1936, 2:4.
By mediation or conciliation is usually meant the bringing together of
employers and employees for a peaceable settlement of their differences by
discussion or negotiation. The mediator may be either a private or an official
individual or board, and may make inquiries without compulsory powers, trying
to induce the two parties by mutual concessions to effect a settlement." COM-
MONS AND ANDREWS, PRINCIPLES OF LABOR LEGISLATION (revised ed. 1927) 136.
This method has met with indifferent success. It is being applied in the present
elevator strike. N. Y. Times, March 8, 1936, 1:1.
"Compulsory arbitration consists in the government's directly or indirectly
compelling employers and employees to submit their disputes to an outside
agency for decision." CoMMoiks AND ANDREWS, op. cit. supra note 60, at 137.
' LABOR AND THE GOVERNMENT, op. cit. mtpra note 13, at 168-70; COMMONS
AND ANDREWS, op cit. supra note 60, at 163-80.
1 The Kansas Industrial Relations Act of 1920 provided for compulsory
arbitration of labor disputes in railroads and other public utilities, the clothing,
coal, and food industries. Strikes, picketing, and boycotts were forbidden.
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was subsequently declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court.6 4
Organized labor has consistently opposed compulsory arbitration
largely on the ground that it takes away the right to strike. In
choosing a middle road the Wagner Act attempts to combine vol-
untary arbitration and the best features of compulsory investigation.6
It is believed that the procedure outlined by the Act will safeguard
equality of collective bargaining and thereby promote industrial
peace. Verging away from any form of compulsory arbitration,
the statute places no restraint on the right to strike. It seeks merely
to subordinate this weapon to the negotiative process. The American
Federation of Labor has acquiesced readily in this subordination of
its most potent weapon in the belief that the outlawry of the unfair
practices and the enunciation of collective bargaining and majority
rule are worth the loss.
Opposed by workers and employers, in 1925 the Industrial Relations Court
was replaced by the Kansas Public Service Commission, later succeeded by
the Commission of Labor and Industry. LABOR AND THE GOVERNMENT, Op. Cit.
supra note 13, at 120-22; COMMONS AND ANDREWS, op. cit. supra note 60, at
185-86.
"In Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Industrial Relations, 262 U. S. 522,
43 Sup. Ct. 630 (1923), the Court declared unconstitutional that part of the
Act which gave the Industrial Relations Court the power to fix wages so far as
industries not classed as public utilities were concerned. The fixing of wages
by compulsory arbitration in the packing industry was held inconsistent with
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In Wolff Packing Co. v.
Court of Industrial Relations, 267 U. S. 552, 45 Sup. Ct. 441 (1925), the Court
held that the meat-packing industry was not affected with public interest, and
held unconstitutional that part of the Act which empowered the industrial
court to fix the hours of work on the ground that it infringed the liberty of
contract and the rights of property guaranteed by the due process clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. As a result of these decisions, it appears that
because of constitutional limitations, compulsory arbitration could not be
practiced in the United States in industries not affected with public interest.
'Under the Railway Labor Act of 1926, a statute which combines the
principles of voluntary arbitration and compulsory investigation, there has been
"an almost unbroken record of peaceful settlement of labor disputes on the
railroads. * * * Since the enactment of the Railway Labor Act of 1926 it has
become the established policy of practically all railroads to enter into such
collective labor contracts with their employees." In 1935, 3,021 collective
agreements were made under the guidance of the Mediation Board. N. Y.
Times, Dec. 30, 1935, 2:5. "Voluntary arbitration occurs when the two parties,
unable to settle the controversy by themselves or with the assistance of a
mediator agree to submit the points at issue to an umpire or arbitrator, by
whose decision they promise to abide. * * * Arbitration remains strictly volun-
tary even if at every step the state uses its compulsory power. * * * Under the
system of compulsory investigation, a board created by the state summons
witnesses and takes testimony on the initiative of one party to the dispute
without the consent of the other." COMfMONS AND ANDREWS, op. cit. supra
note 60, at 136-37.
judge Barnes, in his recent nullification of the Wagner Act, characterizes
as one of its unconstitutional features, the requirement that employers bargain
collectively with their employees. He finds in this requirement a system of
compulsory unilateral arbitration violative of the Fifth Amendment. N. Y.
Times, March 25, 1936, 5:3, 4, 5, 6. See sapra note 49.
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It is with great trepidation that organized labor anticipates the
decision of the Supreme Court on this legislation. The peculiar
twist given to the Sherman Anti-Trust Act 66 and the judicial repeal
of the Clayton Act 07 have not been forgotten.68 An index to labor's
fears concerning the invalidation of this new legislation is found in
the almost daily demands of its leaders for a new amendment to the
Constitution.69
Although organized labor is at present rent asunder by the fun-
damental problem of craft versus industrial unionism, 70 there is
unanimity of opinion as to the desirability of the Wagner Act, a
unanimity which does not bode well for an unfavorable ruling.7 1
ISIDORE STARR.
'Sherman Anti-Trust Act, 26 STAT. 209 (1890), 15 U. S. C. A. §§ 1-7(1927) ; see Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U. S. 274, 28 Sup. Ct. 301 (1908).
'Clayton Act, 38 STAT. 730 (1914), 15 U. S. C. A. §§ 12-27 (1927).
Section 6 of the Act declared that the "labor of a human being is not a com-
modity or article of commerce" and Section 20 provided that no injunction shall
prohibit the quitting of work, the refusal to patronize, peaceful picketing or
peaceful persuasion, whether these Acts are done singly or in concert, and that
these Acts shall not be considered violations of any law of the United States.
In commenting on the Clayton Act, BLUM, in his LABOR ECONOMICS (1925) at
96-97 stated: "Never has a more futile legislative gesture been made nor have
higher hopes been wrecked by judicial interpretation. * * * Since the passage of
the Clayton Act, the Courts have in reality become the legislators." In Ameri-
can Steel Foundries Co. v. Tri-City Central Trades Council, 257 U. S. 184,
42 Sup. Ct. 72 (1921) and Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U. S.
443, 41 Sup. Ct. 172 (1921), the Court construed the Clayton Act as having
made no change in the previously existing law. See also Truax v. Corrigan,
257 U. S. 312, 42 Sup. Ct 124 (1921).
6The late Miss Jane Addams reported: "From my own experience I
should say, perhaps, that the one symptom among workingmen which most
definitely indicates a class feeling is a growing distrust of the integrity of the
courts-the belief that the present judge has been a corporation attorney, that
his sympathies and experience and his whole view of life is in the corporation
side." Quoted in CoMMoNs, TRADE UNIONISM AND LABOR PROBLEMS 613. The
justifiability of labor's hostility to judicial emasculation of statutes aimed
to safeguard their rights is appreciated by many commentators. Professor
Corwin, in his TWILIGHT OF THE SUPREME COURT (1934) at 112, states: "Nor
when the constitutional views of Congress and those of the Court have clashed
is it the latter which have usually prevailed in the long run." See GOLDBERG
AND LEVENSON, LAWLESS JUDGES (1935).
IN. Y. Times, Jan. 15, 1936, 19:1; N. Y. Times, March 8, 1936, 9:1, 2;
Herald Tribune, Feb. 17, 1936, 17:7, 8. See LABOR AND THE GOVERNMENT, op.
cit. supra note 13, pp. 36-42; Saposs, Industrial Uniontism, THE JOURNAL OF
POLITICAL ECONOMY, Feb., 1935, pp. 69-83.
IN. Y. Times, Nov. 25, 1935, 18:23 (ed.) ; Nov. 26, 1935, 10:4-7; Dec. 1,
1935, IV, 10:1, 2, 3.
"To present-day economic and social conditions the doctrines alluded to
[by the Supreme Court in the past] have little if any relevance for a com-
munity Which tends to remain democratic; and if 'realities must dominate the
judgment,' as the Court has said (288 U. S. at 360) they must, the outlook for
such doctrines is not bright. 'Back to the Constitution'? The first requirement
of the Constitution of a progressive society is that it keep pace with that
society." CORWIN, TWILIGHT OF THE SUPREME: COURT (1934) 184.
